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A SOCIAL CAPITAL MODEL OF HIGH-GROWTH VENTURES 
JUAN FLORIN 
Bryant College 
MICHAEL LUBATKIN 
University of Connecticut and EM Lyon 
WILLIAM SCHULZE 
Case Western Reserve University 
We use social capital theory to explain how human and social capital affect a venture's 
ability to accumulate financial capital during its growth stages (before an initial public 
offering) and its performance during the two-year period after going public. Consistent 
with theory, data drawn from a sample of 275 ventures that went public indicate that 
social capital leverages the productivity of a venture's resource base and provides the 
venture with a durable source of competitive advantage. 
When entrepreneurial firms initiate high-growth 
strategies, they face the challenge of accumulating 
supporting resources from factor and capital mar- 
kets in which they have yet to establish legitimacy 
(Brush, Greene, & Hart, 2001). To date, research on 
this challenge has focused on the independent ef- 
fects of human, social, or financial capital but has 
lacked a theory to explain how these different types 
of resources might act in concert. Shane and Ven- 
kataraman (2000) and Gartner (1988) have noted 
that this omission may have caused researchers to 
underspecify models of venture creation and 
growth. 
The purpose of this study is to propose and test a 
model that can explain relationships among types 
of resources and consequently provide a more fully 
specified empirical model of the relationship be- 
tween social capital and firm performance. Our 
model is grounded in a theory of social capital, 
which we extend to the management literature 
from the socioeconomic literature (e.g., Loury, 
1987; Schiff, 1992). Our core thesis is that social 
capital contributes directly to a venture's resource 
base, by allowing it to better attract human and 
financial resources, and also contributes indirectly, 
through its ability to leverage the productivity of 
the venture's resources. 
We tested this thesis in the two steps portrayed 
in Figure 1. In the first step, we used data drawn 
from a sample of 275 ventures that went public to 
examine the relationship between a venture's hu- 
man and social resources and its ability to accumu- 
late financial capital during its pre-IPO growth 
stages-that is, the period up to, and including, the 
generation of proceeds from its initial public offer- 
ing (IPO). In the second step, we assessed the extent 
to which a venture's pre-IPO endowments account 
for profitability and firm growth during the two- 
year period following its IPO. We begin here by 
reviewing research about the direct effects of hu- 
man and social resources on venture performance 
and then use this research to ground hypotheses 
about the indirect effects of these resources on ven- 
ture profitability and growth. We conclude by dis- 
cussing the broader implications of our findings for 
management theory and practice. 
THE EFFECTS OF HUMAN AND SOCIAL 
RESOURCES 
The Direct Effects of Human Resources 
Human resources have long been viewed as being 
essential to a venture's ability to survive and grow. 
Superior human resources can reduce outside 
stakeholder uncertainty. During a venture's pre- 
growth stages, potential stakeholders from the in- 
put, output, labor, and capital markets lack reliable 
information about product or service quality, the 
size of the market for that product or service, the 
accuracy of sales and earnings forecasts, creditwor- 
thiness, and so on. Consequently, whether or not 
these stakeholders provide resources to a firm will 
depend partly on how they view the credentials of 
its key players. Thus, a venture's human resources 
act as a surrogate indicator of its competence and 
credibility (Pennings, Lee, & Witteloostuijn, 1998). 
Superior human resources can also enhance a 
venture's dynamic capabilities. During the transi- 
tional post-IPO stage, when market uncertainties 
are high, ventures that are endowed with better 
human resources should be more able to effectively 
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plan, troubleshoot, and problem-solve (Snell & 
Dean, 1992), and they should be better able to con- 
tinuously adapt to environmental contingencies 
(Youndt, Snell, Dean, & Lepak, 1996). They should 
also be more able to find new ways to increase 
customer benefits (Coleman, 1988), by decreasing 
production and organizational costs and/or by in- 
novating (Lengnick-Hall, 1992), or by identifying 
ways to stretch limited financial resources (Chan- 
dler & Hanks, 1998). Thus, superior human re- 
sources enhance a venture's ability to attain, sus- 
tain, and even enhance its competitive advantage 
during its pre- and post-IPO growth stages. 
Hypothesis l a. There is a positive relationship 
between a venture's human resource endow- 
ment and its ability to accumulate financial 
capital during its pre-IPO growth stages. 
Hypothesis lb. There is a positive relationship 
between a venture's human resource endow- 
ment and its post-IPO performance. 
Interestingly, previous studies indicate mixed 
support for Hypothesis la. Although some re- 
searchers (e.g., Freid & Hisrich, 1994; MacMillan, 
Zemann, & Subbanarasimha, 1987; Tyebjee & 
Bruno, 1984) have found that the.relationship be- tween the quality of a venture's human resource 
base and its ability to acquire funding is positive, 
others have reported that only certain characteris- 
tics, like industry experience (Hall & Hofer, 1993; 
Zacharakis & Meyer, 2000) and education (Cooper, 
Gimeno-Gascon, & Woo, 1994), are important. Sup- 
port for the effect of a founding team's prior 
start-up experience on venture performance (Gart- 
ner, Starr, & Bhat, 1998) is also mixed, even for 
start-ups founded by "serial entrepreneurs" (Alsos 
& Kolvereid, 1998). 
One explanation for the past mixed support for 
the relationship stated in Hypothesis la is that no 
study has examined the durability of the ad- 
vantages that human resources might provide; we 
formalize a conjecture about such durability in Hy- 
pothesis lb. Researchers may also have underesti- 
mated the performance effect of human resources 
by examining only direct relationships and not 
those emanating from the interaction of human re- 
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sources with social resources. Or, as Shane and 
Venkataraman noted, "It is improbable that entre- 
preneurship can be explained solely by references 
to a characteristic of certain people independent of 
the situations in which they find themselves" 
(2000: 218). We develop hypotheses concerning the 
direct and indirect (situational) effects of social 
resources in the next section. 
The Direct Effects of Social Resources 
Social capital theory was founded on the premise 
that a network provides value to its members by 
allowing them access to the social resources that 
are embedded within the network (Bourdieu, 1985; 
Seibert, Kraimer, & Liden, 2001). Originally devel- 
oped by sociologists to explain the role of family in 
the development of neighborhoods (Jacobs, 1961), 
the theory has been expanded to explain a variety 
of outcomes, including industry creation (Aldrich 
& Fiol, 1994), firm growth (Ostgaard & Birley, 
1994), and career success (Seibert et al., 2001). We 
deduced that social capital theory is particularly 
well suited to explain a venture's success from 
three concepts: Burt's (1992) structural holes con- 
cept, according to which it is advantageous for a 
unit to be linked to other units that are themselves 
unconnected; Granovetter's (1973) weak tie con- 
cept, according to which it is advantageous to have 
many narrowly defined links; and Lin's (1999) so- 
cial resource theory, according to which advan- 
tages stem from the nature of the resources embed- 
ded in a network. 
High-growth entrepreneurial ventures are gener- 
ally run by a small number of colleagues who act 
like a social clique (all members are interconnected 
by emotionally intense links), and therefore can 
lack the requisite diversity of reference frames 
about best practices, customer needs, competitor 
moves, and so on. Thus, it is advantageous for a 
venture to form many links with high-status (cred- 
ible and competent) external partners who have a 
diverse set of experience (Burt, 1992). The social 
resources embedded in such networks can signal 
potential stakeholders that a venture's business 
concept is legitimate in much the same way that 
human resources are thought to signal legitimacy. 
However, whereas the human capital explanation 
is based on the credentials of a venture's manage- 
ment team, the social capital explanation is based 
on the credentials of the team's social contacts. 
Also like human resources, the social resources 
embedded in such networks are thought to reduce 
the amount of time and investment required to 
gather information. Narrowly defined links in these 
networks are valuable conduits for knowledge dif- 
fusion and transfer (Coleman, 1988) and for knowl- 
edge combinations, which can spark the develop- 
ment of a firm's intellectual capital (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998) and support "knowledge-creating 
organizations" (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995: 67). 
Thus, social resources, like human resources, can 
provide a venture with the ability to attain, sustain, 
and even enhance its competitive advantage. 
Accordingly: 
Hypothesis 2a. There is a positive relationship 
between a venture's social resource endow- 
ment and its ability to accumulate financial 
capital during its pre-IPO growth stages. 
Hypothesis 2b. There is a positive relationship 
between a venture's social resource endow- 
ment and its post-IPO performance. 
Published findings show some support for Hy- 
pothesis 2a (Chan, 1983; Fried & Hisrich, 1994). For 
example, Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) found that pro- 
fessional relationships with influential people 
helped ventures in locating capital. However, no 
study has investigated the durability of the advan- 
tages that social resources might provide (that is, 
their post-IPO effects), or their ability to leverage 
the productivity of a venture's internal resource 
base. 
The Indirect Effects of Social Resources 
Social capital theory also implies that social re- 
sources have important indirect effects. Loury 
(1987) posited that an individual's achievement is 
conditioned by the social context in which the 
individual matures (the family, community, and 
municipality). Schiff (1992) and Coleman (1988) 
expressed a similar view, arguing that the produc- 
tive potential of social capital lies in its ability to 
enhance returns on human resources and financial 
capital. 
This belief also makes intuitive sense; as Na- 
hapiet and Ghoshal put it, "Who you know affects 
what you know" (1998: 252). The more informa- 
tionally rich a venture's external social network is, 
and the more competent its top managers are (that 
is, the more valuable its human resources), the 
more knowledge they will be able to assimilate, 
value, and apply from the informationally enriched 
social network (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). This can 
set in motion a "virtuous cycle": The more that a 
venture's human resources are enhanced by exter- 
nal social linkages, the more attractive it becomes 
to other key external stakeholders, who, in turn, 
provide access to additional resources and expand 
the venture's portfolio of capabilities for exploiting 
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new opportunities. Put differently, a venture's so- 
cially complex and historically unique configura- 
tion of human and social resources can result in a 
set of durable, rare, and inimitable resource bun- 
dles. Hence, 
Hypothesis 3a. The interaction between a ven- 
ture's social resources and human resources 
has a positive effect on its ability to accumu- 
late financial capital during its pre-IPO growth 
stages. 
Hypothesis 3b. The interaction between a ven- 
ture's social resources and human resources has 
a positive effect on its post-IPO performance. 
Although ventures must accumulate financial 
capital during their pre-IPO growth stages to sur- 
vive and to fund development (Dean & Giglierano, 
1990; Starr & MacMillan, 1990), financial capital by 
itself is not a productive resource: having it does 
not ensure post-IPO commercial success. Rather, in 
line with arguments posed by Schiff (1992) and 
Coleman (1988), its productive potential is deter- 
mined through its interaction with social resources. 
The more informationally rich a venture's external 
social network, therefore, the more opportunities it 
will have to invest financial capital in projects with 
high internal rates of return. Informationally rich 
external social networks also enhance the venture's 
ability to withstand random environmental shocks 
(Bruderl, Preisendorfer, & Ziegler, 1992; Cooper et 
al., 1994). Whereas we predict in Hypothesis la, 
Hypothesis 2a, and Hypothesis 3a that the amount 
of financial capital accumulated during the growth 
stages prior to a venture's initial public offering is 
associated with the quality of the venture's human 
and social resources, we now predict that social 
resource endowment, given its idiosyncratic and 
dynamic nature, will improve a venture's ability to 
compete by enabling it to leverage its expanded 
financial base. Thus, 
Hypothesis 4. The interaction between a ven- 
ture's social resources and its financial capital 
has a positive effect on the venture's post-IPO 
performance. 
METHODS 
We drew our sample from the population of U.S. 
initial public offerings for 1996. Keeping to the 
sampling criteria used in other studies of ventures 
with high-growth potential (Robinson, 1999; Wel- 
bourne & Andrews, 1996), we excluded financial 
institutions, real estate concerns, "rollups," spin- 
offs or subsidiaries of large firms, holding compa- 
nies, and firms with over 800 employees or over 
$500 million in assets at the time of their IPOs. 
After exclusions, 275 ventures remained. Their 
founding dates varied; some went public soon after 
they were founded, while others were founded in 
the 1980s but were not eligible for IPO until after 
they had redesigned their products/services or 
changed their market or technology. Data about 
each venture's strategy, operations, financials, 
management background, ownership, and compet- 
itive environment was obtained from S1 prospec- 
tuses, proxy statements, and year-end financial 
statements filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) from inception to two years af- 
ter their initial public offerings. These data, which 
have proven useful to other investigations (e.g., 
Marino, Castaldi, & Dollinger, 1989), are presumed 
reliable; the SEC requires that the contents of these 
filings be accurate to the best of management's 
knowledge and holds firms liable for any mislead- 
ing information. 
Our independent variable, human resources, was 
a composite of three commonly used firm-level 
measures: industry experience, start-up experi- 
ence, and venture capitalist directorships. Industry 
experience was the number of a venture's top man- 
agement team members that had worked previously 
in the venture's primary industry or had had expe- 
rience with its primary technology; any amount of 
such experience was counted (Cooper et al., 1994; 
Shepherd, 1999). Start-up experience was the num- 
ber of top managers that had previously started new 
businesses; we included this measure in light of 
previous research findings showing that such man- 
agers can contribute important know-how (Carter, 
Williams, & Reynolds, 1997; Stuart & Abetti, 1990). 
Venture capitalist directorships was the number of 
venture capitalists who were on a firm's board 
(Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, & Vetsuypens, 1990; 
Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Lee, Lee, & Pennings, 
2001). When no theory exists to rank extant defini- 
tions of a construct in terms of importance, equal 
weighting is recommended (McGee, Dowling, & 
Megginson, 1995; Welbourne & Andrews, 1996). 
We therefore summed the above three measures to 
form an equally weighted composite.1 
We also constructed an equally weighted firm- 
level composite measure of social resources, consist- 
1 Tests were conducted to make sure that the results 
were not unduly influenced by the size of a management 
team. We also found that a commonly used human re- 
source measure, level of education, did not influence the 
regression analysis results, whether the measure was 
used independently or as a part of our composite 
measure. We therefore excluded it from our primary 
analyses. 
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ing of the sum of three commonly used proxies, busi- 
ness network, personal network, and underwriters. 
Business network was the number of arms-length 
relationships and alliances with Fortune 1000 cli- 
ents and suppliers that a firm had at the time of its 
IPO (Chung, Singh, & Lee, 2000; Deeds, Decarolis, & 
Coombs, 1997; Pennings et al., 1998). Such rela- 
tionships provide access to established networks 
and a potentially large customer base. Personal net- 
work was a count of the number of top management 
team members and directors who were also direc- 
tors of other firms with similar technologies or mar- 
kets. This measure has been used as a proxy for the 
network's informational richness because board 
memberships provide access to knowledge and re- 
sources outside the immediate environment of new 
firms (Ostgaard & Birley, 1996; Starr & MacMillan, 
1990). Finally, since underwriters introduce a ven- 
ture's top management to potential investors, we 
coded this variable as the count of the number of 
underwriters that subscribed to an IPO. Following 
Chung and colleagues (2000), we qualified the 
count by assigning a "reputational" weight to the 
lead underwriter that was based on the number of 
initial public offerings it had successfully com- 
pleted. Certo, Covin, Daily, and Dalton (2001) 
found that investors associate the number of IPOs 
completed by an underwriter with its ability to 
accurately assess a venture's future value. 
The dependent variable used in our test of the 
three pre-IPO hypotheses (la, 2a, and 3a; see step 1 
in Figure 1) was financial capital. Like Robinson 
(1999), we measured accumulated financial capital 
by adding a venture's assets during the quarter just 
prior to the date of its IPO to the proceeds from that 
offering, the latter being the much larger of the two 
components. We controlled for the asset intensity 
of the firm's industry sector by including both liq- 
uid and hard assets in our calculation. 
We used two dependent variables, sales growth 
(the two-year change in sales after the year of an 
IPO) and return on sales (ROS; profits over sales in 
the second year after the year of the IPO) to test the 
four post-IPO hypotheses (lb, 2b, Hypotheses 3b, 
and 4; see step 2 in Figure 1).2 Each of the two 
2 The fact that the pre- and post-IPO hypotheses were 
being tested with many of the same variables initially 
raised concerns about independence (that is, concern 
that the results of the post-IPO tests might be driven by 
the hypothesized pre-IPO relationships). We therefore 
calculated the models' residuals. Virtually no relation- 
ship was found. The correlation between the residuals 
(or disturbance terms) of the pre-IPO and sales growth 
models is .01 (p < .84), and the correlation between the 
residuals of the pre-IPO and ROS models is -.02 (p < .73). 
dependent measures captured a different dimen- 
sion of market legitimacy-the ability of a venture 
to compete for customers and for limited resources 
in its chosen market niche-and thus each is par- 
ticularly relevant to gauging early market success. 
Further, and as Bettis (1981) observed in his cri- 
tique of Rumelt's (1974) findings for related- 
constrained firms, ROS (profit margin) provides a 
less biased performance statistic than return on 
assets (ROA) in cross-sectional comparisons of 
firms that are expected to vary by the asset-inten- 
sity requirements of their market niches. Finally, 
because both of our dependent measures were 
based on operational performance, they are unbi- 
ased by the bullish expectations that characterized 
the capital and IPO markets in 1996. 
Because our purpose was to assess the extent to 
which a firm's pre-IPO endowment of human and 
social (but not other) resources affected its post-IPO 
performance, financial capital (the dependent vari- 
able used to test Hypotheses la, 2a, and 3a) was 
used as an independent variable in the regression 
analyses that tested Hypotheses lb, 2b, 3b, and 4. 
We controlled for size (sales dollars the year prior 
to the IPO), firm age at the time of the IPO, and hot 
industry sector (the number of IPOs that occurred 
in a focal venture's industry sector in the period 
from two years before the year of its IPO to two 
years after). Finance researchers use the term "hot- 
ness" to describe the amount of investor activity 
associated with a particular industry sector (Ritter, 
1989). As such, hotness is conceptually analogous 
to what ecologists refer to as a sector's "carrying 
capacity" (Hannan & Carroll, 1992) and to what 
strategists call "munificence" (in that the higher the 
number of new ventures that successfully go public 
in a particular sector, the more munificent the sec- 
tor can be presumed to be). Because the competi- 
tive value of resources may vary with industry con- 
ditions (Barney, 1996), we tested the sensitivity of 
the regression coefficients in all models by adding 
hot industry sector as a covariate. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and correlations are shown 
in Tables 1 and 2, and the regression results are in 
Table 3. Following Aiken and West (1993), we cen- 
tered all variables before using three-step moder- 
ated hierarchical regression analyses to separately 
test the hypothesized relationships with financial 
capital (model 1), sales growth (model 2), and re- 
turn on sales (model 3). We entered the covariates 
and independent variables in the first step (shown 
in Table 3 as the first column of results for each 
model), added the hypothesized interactions in the 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Statistics 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean s.d. 
Firm age at IPO 0.00 30.00 7.22 5.00 
Venture capitalist 0.00 80.00 23.58 20.68 
ownershipa 
Sales at IPOb 0.02 457.00 25.16 53.38 
Income at IPOb -17.00 12.00 -1.63 4.02 
Number of employees 4.00 755.00 149.66 44.63 
Business network 0.00 10.00 3.24 3.51 
Personal network 0.00 21.00 6.34 3.31 
Venture capitalist board 0.00 6.00 1.63 1.43 
seats 
Industry experience 1.00 15.00 5.28 2.33 
Start-up experience 0.00 6.00 0.50 0.74 
Number of underwriters 1.00 4.00 2.12 0.83 
a Percentage. 
b In millions of dollars. 
TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations 
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Human resources 7.4 3.2 
2. Social resources 5.6 4.9 .46*** 
3. Sales at IPO 25.2 53.4 .28** .49** 
4. Firm age at IPO 7.2 5.0 .01 .07 .31"* 
5. Hot industry sector 94.6 68.8 .08 .31** .18** -.03 
6. Financial capital 40.1 32.7 .48*** .49** .58** .08 .04 
7. Sales growth 37.4 92.1 .14* .29** .45** -.04 .06 .40* 
8. Return on sales -9.5 49.0 
-.18"* .14* .30** .13* .03 -.02 .10 
* 
p < .05 
** 
p < .01 
*** p < .001 
second step (column 2), and tested for industry 
sector effects in the final step (column 3). The F- 
statistic associated with the set of covariates is sig- 
nificant at the .05 level or better in all three models, 
as are the F-statistics associated with the entry of 
the main effects and with the entry of the hypoth- 
esized interactions. As indicated by the results re- 
ported in column 3 of each model, the hotness of an 
industry sector had no effect on the hypothesized 
relationships. Collinearity statistics from each of 
the three models (not shown) revealed no 
problems. 
Model 1 reports results for the three pre-IPO hy- 
potheses (la, 2a, and 3a). Hypothesis la and Hy- 
pothesis 2a are supported: There is a positive rela- 
tionship between a firm's human (p < .001) and 
social (p < .001) resources and its ability to accu- 
mulate financial capital prior to its IPO. Contrary to 
Hypothesis 3a, however, social resources had a 
negative effect on the relationship between human 
resources and financial capital (p < .01). To inves- 
tigate what caused the negative relationship, we 
followed Aiken and West (1993) and plotted the 
simple slopes of the interaction term (Figure 2). 
The plots reveal that the negative sign is the prod- 
uct of a steeper (more positive) slope for the rela- 
tionship between human resources and financial 
capital when social resources are low, and a 
slightly less steep slope when social resources are 
high. The plots also show that for all levels of 
human resources, ventures with higher social re- 
sources accumulated more financial capital than 
those lacking social resources. Finally, the plots 
show that the relationship between human re- 
sources and financial capital remains positive over 
the full range of values for social resources. On the 
whole, we conclude that the results for Hypothesis 
3a are generally consistent with our theory and 
expectations. 
Results for the four post-IPO hypotheses, lb, 2b, 
3b, and 4, are reported in model 2 (where sales 
growth is the dependent variable) and model 3 (for 
380 Academy of Management Journal June 
TABLE 3 
Results of Regression Analysesa 
Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: 
Variables Financial Capital Sales Growth Return on Sales 
Covariates 
Firm size .45*** .44*** .43*** .40*** .43*** 
.43*** .42*** .41*** .41*** 
Firm age -.07 -.07 -.07 -.19"* -.21*** -.21*** .02 .03 .02 
Hot industry sector -.14** -.14** -.14** -.04 -.03 -.04 -.08 -.07 .07 
Main effects 
Hypothesis 1: Human resources .27*** .26*** .27*** -.08 -.03 -.04 -.25*** -.26*** -.27*** 
Hypothesis 2: Social resources .21*** .23*** .23*** .05 -.05 -.06 .18* .16* .16" 
Financial capital .20** .25** .26** -.23** -.20* -.20* 
Interactions 
Hypothesis 3: -.13** -.15** .00 .01 .18** .20*** 
Human resources x social resources 
Hypothesis 4: .22*** .23*** -.04 -.04 
Financial capital x social resources 
Hot industry sector x human resources .05 -.03 -.05 
Hot industry sector x social resources -.02 .02 .00 
Hot industry sector x financial capital -.04 .00 
F 51.17*** 45.60*** 34.17*** 14.93*** 13.49*** 9.80*** 10.16*** 8.93*** 6.50*** 
AR2 .02** .00 .04** .00 .03* .00 
R2 .49 .50 .51 .27 .31 .31 .20 .23 .23 
Adjusted R2 .48 .49 .49 .25 .29 .28 .18 .20 .20 
n 275 275 275 249 249 249 247 247 247 
a Coefficients are standardized beta weights. 
* 
p < .05 
** 
p < .01 
*** p < .001 
return on sales). Results for Hypothesis lb (testing 
the effects of human resources), and for Hypothesis 
2b (testing the effects of social resources) are 
mixed: While neither hypothesis found support 
when we used sales growth as the dependent vari- 
able (model 2), both were supported when we used 
return on sales (model 3; p < .001 and p < .05, 
respectively). However, and contrary to Hypothesis 
lb, the relationship between human resources and 
return on sales is negative. Perhaps firms whose 
leaders choose very fast growth sacrifice profitabil- 
ity for high sales growth and require better- 
endowed top management teams to succeed with 
this strategy. We found partial support for this 
speculation in the significant and positive (not 
hypothesized) relationship between financial 
capital and sales growth (model 2) and in the sig- 
nificant and negative relationship between finan- 
cial capital and return on sales (model 3). It is 
important to point out, however, that social re- 
sources is positively related to return on sales (Hy- 
pothesis 2b) and that it moderates the relationship 
between human resources and return on sales (Hy- 
pothesis 3b; model 3; p < .01). The plot for this 
interaction (Figure 3) shows that the relationship 
between human resources and ROS is less negative 
at higher levels of social resources. In other words, 
high-growth ventures appear to be less unprofitable 
when social resources are high. 
Finally, Hypothesis 4, which posits that social 
resources positively moderate the relationship be- 
tween financial capital and firm performance, is 
supported for sales growth (model 2; p < .001), but 
not for return on sales (model 3; n.s.). 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
To date, high-growth venture research has lacked 
a theory to explain how different resource types 
might act in concert. In this study, we drew insight 
from the socioeconomic literature to propose such 
a theory. Overall, we found that the relationships 
between human resources and performance, and 
between financial capital and performance, both 
vary with the level of social resources. In other 
words, and consistent with our theory and expec- 
tations, social resources leverage the productivity 
of a venture's resource base. 
Another finding was that environmental condi- 
tions do not affect the observed pattern of relation- 
ships; none were moderated by whether a firm's 
industry sector was hot in that it had seen espe- 
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FIGURE 2 
Plot of Hypothesis 3a: The Effect of Social Resources on the Relationship 
between Human Resources and Financial Capital 
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cially high levels of IPO activity. It is also interest- 
ing to note that among the covariates, firm size 
(sales in the year of the IPO) shows, as expected, a 
positive and highly significant association with the 
dependent variables. In contrast, firm age at the 
time of the IPO is only statistically meaningful in 
model 2, where it was negatively associated with 
sales growth: younger ventures show higher levels 
of growth, most likely because their growth rate is 
magnified by a small start-up base. Finally, we 
found no evidence that the results in the three 
models are sensitive to a venture's location. The 
sample firms were geographically distributed al- 
most equally: approximately a third were located 
near the areas of the U.S. West Coast known for 
high-technology endeavors; a third were in similar 
East Coast areas; and a third were spread through- 
out the United States. An exploratory examination 
of location using dummy coding (available upon 
request) added no explanatory power to any of the 
three tested models. 
The fact that we found support for our social 
capital model after controlling for firm size, age, 
location, and industry sector leads us to speculate 
that the model might also explain the performance 
of established public firms and small private firms 
pursuing high growth by redesigning their products 
or services or by venturing into markets in which 
they lack immediate legitimacy. We speculate that, 
just as they do for ventures, growth-oriented 
changes made by established firms will engender 
skepticism from lenders, investors, and customers. 
And, again, just as we theorized for ventures, such 
skepticism can be mitigated if stakeholders per- 
ceive a firm as having high levels of human re- 
sources (an experienced and capable management 
team) and social resources (positive relationships 
with individuals and institutions that lend legiti- 
macy). This speculation points to future investiga- 
tions of growth strategies using other sample 
frames. 
Interestingly, social capital's effects appear to be 
both quite durable-lasting over the two-year pe- 
riod following the year of an IPO-and to vary 
across the two post-IPO performance measures. Al- 
though both measures reflect a venture's ability to 
compete for customers and limited resources in its 
chosen market niche, they may be capturing differ- 
ent dimensions of performance. Sales growth cap- 
tures a forward-looking trend in revenues, indepen- 
dent of the costs incurred to obtain them. In 
contrast, ROS is a static measure of the productivity 
of past investments. Not surprisingly, the correla- 
tion between these two variables is small (r = .10) 
and not significant. 
These differences may shed light on why the sign 
of the financial capital variable was positive in the 
sales growth model (model 2) and negative in the 
ROS model. Consistent with Chandler and Hank's 
(1994) finding that ventures with more resources 
tend to grow faster, we suspect that firms that were 
able to accumulate more funds up to the time of 
their IPOs could better afford to focus on growth 
(hence the positive association of financial capital 
and sales growth), without being overly concerned 
with profitability (hence a null to negative financial 
capital-ROS association). Of course, the growth-at- 
any-expense business model has obvious practical 
limits, as was shown by the late 1990s stock per- 
formance of many high-technology firms. 
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FIGURE 3 
Plot of Hypothesis 3b: The Effect of Social Resources on the Relationship 
between Human Resources and Return on Sales 
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Our findings may suffer from a survivor bias; we 
only examined the effects of human and social 
resources on ventures that secured IPO financing. 
Second, all the sample firms went public in a rel- 
atively bullish year, 1996. And, although the use of 
cross-sectional analyses should minimize any cap- 
ital market bias-as should conducting post-IPO 
tests that relied on operating performance mea- 
sures-it remains an open question whether the 
model explains venture performance during bear 
markets. Third, while we drew direction from pub- 
lished studies in constructing measures of human 
and social resources and used multiple measures, 
our composite measures are nevertheless indirect 
proxies of largely unobservable phenomena, and 
therefore they may lack precision. For example, our 
measure of industry experience, like others used in 
other recently published studies, does not account 
for the length of experience. Finally, we used equal 
weighting to construct our two composite resource 
measures. More work like Shepherd's (1999) field 
experiment is needed to develop a theory for rank- 
ing the various resource proxies in terms of their 
importance. 
Shane and Venkataraman recently stated that 
"entrepreneurship involves the nexus of two phe- 
nomena: the presence of lucrative opportunities 
and the presence of enterprising individuals" 
(2000: 218). Our test of a social capital model 
suggests that the nexus is not complete unless 
researchers also consider the presence of social 
resources and their ability to leverage the produc- 
tivity of a venture's resource base. We speculate 
that the current findings inform not only the man- 
agers of high-growth entrepreneurial ventures, but 
also the managers of established firms who are in 
pursuit of high growth. 
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